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BILATERAL DONOR PRACTICES WITH AGRICULTURAL AID TO RWANDA

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ABSTRACT

Agricultural development can improve rural economies where poverty is concentrated in rural areas and agriculture dominates rural livelihoods. This is likely true to many sub-Saharan African countries. Foreign aid plays an important role in supporting agriculture across the continent. Rwanda is unique among African nations in foreign aid. Despite its authoritarian tendencies, Rwanda is considered the so-called “donor darling” receiving the largest per-capita aid in East Africa. Agriculture is integral to Rwanda’s economy. The majority of Rwanda’s population lives in rural areas with agriculture accounting for 27% of the country’s gross domestic product. Considering the economic importance of agriculture, bilateral donors to Rwanda have invested in its agriculture with foreign aid. This study examined details of agricultural aid to Rwanda by analyzing aid portfolios of donors under the division of labor agreement between Rwanda and its bilateral donors. The aid data were drawn from an aid statistics database, sorted and summarized. Fewer similar studies exist that examine donor aid portfolios in agriculture in individual African countries. Therefore, findings of this study can offer rare insights into how bilateral donors navigate institutional constraints in authoritarian settings with their aid. The findings of this study showed that designated donors to Rwanda’s agriculture provided 94% of total agricultural aid mainly as projects and in the two sub-sectors (the agricultural development and agricultural policy support). Designated donors provided agricultural aid mostly through non-state channels, minimizing their direct contact with the Government of Rwanda. The contour of agricultural aid reflected preferences of the two largest donors, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (USA). They collectively accounted for 60% of agricultural aid to Rwanda. The UK was the sole provider of budget support to agriculture up to 2013 after which no donor took over UK’s role. That was arguably due to Rwanda’s involvement in military activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo for which the international community criticized Rwanda. The agricultural donors mostly partnered with donor-based non-governmental organizations, probably because of restrictions imposed on local civic organizations by the Government of Rwanda. The portfolio of agricultural aid indicated that designated donors implemented the aid with minimum direct involvement of the Government of Rwanda and local organizations, suggesting how the donors, especially the UK and the USA viewed the institutional quality of Rwanda.

Key words: Africa, agriculture, bilateral aid, foreign aid, governance, Rwanda, UK, USA

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INTRODUCTION

Agricultural development can improve rural livelihoods in areas where poverty is concentrated in rural areas and agriculture is the major source of livelihoods. Increases in agricultural productivity generate on-farm and off-farm incomes to support economic growth [1]. This is applicable to many sub-Saharan African countries where agriculture remains the economic backbone, accounting for 17% of the region's gross domestic product (GDP) [2]. Despite the economic dominance of agriculture in Africa, poverty persists in rural areas [3], and the region remains a net food importer with its food import bill reaching USD 43 billion in 2022 [4]. Most of the food imported to Africa is the types of foods produced on the continent. This suggests that a key reason for Africa's net food import is low agricultural productivity [5].

Considering the importance of agriculture and its productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, foreign aid donors have invested in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. However, studies show that agricultural aid to Africa is not a random provision, and a better institutional quality of a recipient country is associated with an African nation receiving more agricultural aid [3, 6]. This study, built around the findings from previous research, examines agricultural aid to Rwanda with the following research question, which is why traditional bilateral donors continue to provide agricultural support to Rwanda despite its authoritarian tendencies and occasional friction with western donors. The findings of this study can provide rare insights into the interactions between Rwanda and its bilateral donors who generally highlight good governance.

Rwanda is unique in the context of foreign aid. Despite its leaning towards an authoritarian regime, Rwanda is considered the so-called donor darling, a country that receives more foreign aid than what its institutional indicators would otherwise predict [7]. In 2023, Rwanda received the largest per-capita aid in East Africa (USD 85), compared with Uganda (USD 43), and Kenya (USD 60) [8]. The economy of Rwanda is agriculture-based, accounting for 27% of the country's GDP [9]. With 82% of its population in rural areas, most farm households in Rwanda are smallholders with low agricultural productivity [10]. Given the economic importance of agriculture in Rwanda, bilateral donors have provided substantial aid to the agricultural sector of Rwanda [11].

Rwanda is not the only African nation with an authoritarian government, whose economy relies on agriculture and foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa (for example, Ethiopia and Uganda). Yet, Rwanda is a rare authoritarian country that is favorably depicted by donors. Arguably, donor favoritism is based on the point that donors to Rwanda focus more on its technical governance instead of its political governance



[12]. The country has relatively a well-controlled corruption, generating development outcomes [13], although some studies have raised doubts about the government data related to economic indicators [14, 15]. Rwanda also swiftly adopted aid principles, one of which was the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness [12, 14]. Overall, the government of Rwanda, projected as a technocratic leadership, seems to appeal to donors with its policy choices [12, 16].

The preceding background of Rwanda warrants a detailed examination of bilateral donor practices in the country. To this end, the study was designed to analyze bilateral agricultural aid to Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda prioritizes agriculture for its economic development, and donor behaviors with agricultural aid in Rwanda can offer a better understanding of donor aid tactics. The goal of this study was to provide a country-level understanding in a specific aid sector in sub-Saharan Africa. There exists rich literature focusing on the collective dynamics between recipients and donors, whereas few studies have examined a country-level relationship between a recipient country and its donors in African agriculture [17, 18]. Therefore, findings of this study can offer rare insights into how bilateral donors navigate institutional constraints in authoritarian settings with their aid.

AGRICULTURE AND FOREIGN AID IN AFRICAN CONTEXTS

Role of agriculture in Africa's development

Agriculture is integral to the economies of many African countries with 57% of the population in rural areas [19]. However, the contribution of agriculture to African economies remains inconclusive. Supporters of African agriculture highlight synergies between agricultural development and poverty reduction in Africa. The supporters stress that agriculture in Africa is one of the few economic sectors that has the potential to increase economic growth on the continent [20, 21]. Alternatively, skeptics of African agriculture point to a range of challenges that African agriculture faces. Some of the challenges include slow market development, lack of necessary inputs and infrastructure, high vulnerability to climate change, and limited institutional capacity [20]. Furthermore, it is argued that Africa may not experience the same level of success as Asia's Green Revolution due partly to Africa's heterogeneous agriculture and its reliance on rain-fed farming systems. Asia's Green Revolution, by comparison, was mainly driven by standardized monocropping with irrigated rice and wheat under relatively homogenous agro-environments [1].

Gunasekera *et al.* [5] suggested inadequate investment in the sector as a key constraint to the development of Africa's agriculture. African governments often underinvest in agriculture despite its important roles in African economies. In 2003 African governments adopted the Maputo Declaration to show their commitment to



agriculture. The Maputo Declaration required member states of the African Union (AU) to allocate 10% of total government budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development. However, most of the AU member states failed to meet the goal, spending only 3-6% by 2008. In 2014 the AU member states recommitted to the 10% goal with the Malabo Declaration [22, 23]. A recent biennial review of the Malabo Declaration reported only 4.6% as the overall achievement, thus falling short of meeting the 10% goal [24].

Foreign aid to Africa's agriculture

Foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as an important financial resource for agricultural development, supplementing the insufficient public investment in the sector. In the short term, foreign aid to agriculture may not generate meaningful impacts on food security and economic growth. Some studies have concluded that agricultural aid has a lagging impact on agricultural productivity [3] and longer-term agricultural aid has larger impacts than short-term agricultural aid [5]. Nonetheless, agricultural aid generally helps increase agricultural production in quantity and quality, on- and off-farm employment, and rural household income, all of which can lead to rural poverty mitigation. Over the years, agricultural aid has gradually decreased with yearly fluctuations [25]. A noticeable donor disengagement from agriculture appeared in the late 1990s. Reasons for the donor disengagement include a shift of donor sectoral preferences to social sectors, a lack of international consensus on agricultural development strategies, and fewer lasting results generated by agricultural aid [26].

The debatable efficacy of agricultural aid is probably related to difficulties separating impacts of agricultural aid from impacts of other aid due to their cross-sectional dependency in economic growth. Studies examining the efficacy of agricultural aid may focus on broader changes such as poverty reduction, or narrower changes such as agricultural production. Kaya *et al.* [27] found that agricultural aid reduces poverty and improves welfare in recipient countries. Barkat *et al.* [26] reported that a 1% increase in agricultural aid leads to 0.23-0.37% increase in agricultural production, indicating a low return from agricultural aid. Alvi *et al.* [28] relate a low return of agricultural aid to an unstable flow of agricultural aid, implying that the less stable the flow of agricultural aid is, the lower the return on its investment will be. Barkat *et al.* [26] reported a positive effect of agricultural aid on agricultural production mainly from food production, and not from non-food production. Ssozi *et al.* [6] concluded that agricultural aid increases export crop production, but decreases food crop production. It is argued that agricultural aid likely goes where it increases agricultural productivity such as export or industrial crops. With individual African countries, studies have concluded that agricultural aid has a positive impact on crop production in Nigeria [29] and agriculture value addition in Guinea [30].



Research suggests donor discrimination in agricultural aid. Before making aid decisions, donors consider characteristics of recipient countries, one of which is institutional quality. Asiedu *et al.* [31] showed that a percentage point increase in governance quality can impact the increase in agricultural aid up to 64%. The same study indicated that the rule of law and the corruption control are two factors that positively impact more agricultural aid. Alabi [3] also found that governance quality has a positive impact on agricultural aid in Africa, yet not finding a positive correlation between corruption control and agricultural aid. Cassimon *et al.* [32] reported that controlling corruption and maintaining political stability have significant implications with food aid in sub-Saharan Africa.

To summarize, the contribution of agriculture to Africa's development remains inconclusive while many African economies are agriculture-based. Foreign aid is an important funding source for agricultural development in Africa where public investment in the sector tends to be inadequate. The efficacy of agricultural aid is still debatable. Yet, donors likely discriminate recipient countries based on their characteristics including institutional quality to provide agricultural aid. In this sense (or at least from a theoretic perspective), weakly governed countries with agriculture being their key economic sector become challenging to donors who stress good governance and emphasize agricultural development for economic growth.

RWANDA AND ITS AGRICULTURE

Rwanda's economy is agriculture-based. Most of its population (82%) lives in rural areas, and agriculture accounts for 27% of Rwanda's GDP, which is higher than the average of 17% in sub-Saharan Africa [2]. Agriculture in Rwanda consists largely of subsistence smallholder farming systems that depend on traditional farming practices [10]. The agriculture sector of Rwanda suffers low productivity from various constraints including low adoption of agricultural technologies, low use of improved agricultural inputs, decreasing soil fertility, limited access to credits, insufficient extension services, and poor rural infrastructure. Furthermore, limited access to farmland with farmland fragmentation is arguably a key constraint to agricultural productivity in Rwanda [33]. Rwanda has the second-highest population density (525 people per km²) in Africa, causing an acute arable land issue [34]. Slight variations in estimated farmland sizes in Rwanda exist depending on measurement units. Some of them are less than 0.5 ha per capita of agricultural land [33], 0.76 ha in four separate plots per household [35], and an average of 0.6 ha of a third of households [34]. Fragmented small farmland causes inefficiencies in agricultural production and operation costs, leading to farm businesses being economically unviable without supplementary off-farm earnings or input subsidies [10, 34].



To improve agricultural productivity and reduce rural poverty, the Government of Rwanda introduced a series of agricultural policies, including the Crop Intensification Program (CIP) launched in 2007 [10]. Based on voluntary participation, the program involved four components, allowing synchronized large-scale crop production on fragmented plots [34]. The four components of the CIP comprised distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs, provision of extension services, improvement of postharvest handling and storage technologies, and land use consolidation [33]. The CIP also incentivized farmers to cultivate specific crops – maize, wheat, rice, white potato, beans, and cassava. Thus, it encouraged mono-cropping with these prioritized crops [10].

The policy efforts for concerted agricultural intensification appeared to yield meaningful improvements in certain crops and macroeconomic growth. However, the official results of the CIP remain highly contested. It is argued that the CIP distorted input markets and increased farm income inequality between the CIP zones and the non-CIP zones [10]. Other studies reported that the CIP gained a much more modest increase in growth than the government figures suggested. A study by Heinen offers some empirical evidence showing that Rwanda overestimated its agricultural production and yields between 2008 and 2013 [15]. The same study argued that the data discrepancies were attributed to incentives which local agencies and farmers had by overestimating harvest figures. This might have enabled them to conform to annual performance targets set by the central government enforcing rigid policies. Also, since foreign donors supported the CIP through the Agriculture Investment Programme, the pressure for meeting targets might be substantially high [35].

Concerning aid efficacy, Rwanda and donors discussed the concept of division of labor, reaching agreement in 2010. The concept was introduced to align Rwanda's policy priorities with donor supports, which could reduce transaction costs. The division of labor allows each donor to work in up to three sectors based on the donor's comparative advantages [36]. Under the 2010 agreement, agriculture was supported by Canada, Japan, the UK, and the USA among the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) bilateral donors. In 2013, the sector was supported by Japan, Korea, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. Most recently in 2025, Japan, Korea, the UK, and the USA were the designated donors to agriculture in Rwanda [36]. The division of labor agreement does not necessarily exclude other donors from supporting agriculture in Rwanda. Other donors can participate in agriculture through sector budget support and multi-donor trust funds. Belgium and the Netherlands are such donors supporting agriculture in Rwanda. The following sections examine the main question of the study: how bilateral donors supported Rwanda's agriculture while often facing conflicting situations with the Government of Rwanda due to its



authoritarian leaning and controversial military involvements in neighboring countries, particularly, the Democratic Republic of Congo [37].

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The source of data for this study was secondary, from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics [11]. A summative aid-portfolio analysis was used to examine donor practices in Rwanda. An aid portfolio refers to a combined set of a donor's aid programs and projects in a given recipient country [38]. Bilateral donors subject to data collection were the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members who report aid data annually to the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Non-DAC donors were not included because they do not report aid data regularly.

The timeframe for aid portfolio analyses was between 2011 and 2022, based on data availability. In earlier years, part of the data was incomplete. A basic unit of the aid portfolio analysis was each aid fund transferred from a donor government to Rwanda in a given year. Aid disbursement data were sorted by CRS codes. Aid sectors were sorted by CRS purpose codes, aid types by CRS aid type codes, and aid channels by CRS channel identification codes. The aid portfolio analysis focused on designated donors to agriculture under the division of labor agreement during the study period. The designated donors included Belgium, Canada, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. It should be noted that some detailed data in the following section were not presented in tables. They were included to support main results and extend discussion.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Rwanda received a stable aid with some yearly fluctuations, averaging 5.8 billion per year between 2011 and 2022. The USA was the largest donor, distantly followed by the UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Japan (Table 1). Donors mainly supported five aid sectors being population polices, education, governance, health, and agriculture in this order (Table 1). Those five sectors received aid funds rather evenly, ranging from 11.2% of total aid to 16.0%. This even aid allocation was a likely outcome of two factors, one being the division of labor agreement between Rwanda and donors, and the other being donors' own strategic decisions with their designated sectors. For instance, the largest donor, the USA was a designated donor to population policies, health, education, and agriculture. The USA exerted control over the amounts of aid those designated sectors received. The division of labor agreement itself exercises little authority to determine the amount of aid. When larger donors allocate aid to their respective designated sectors without much



overlapping, it is not improbable to observe an even aid allocation pattern across aid sectors.

Agriculture received 11.2% of total aid, 94.1% of which was provided by the designated donors to agriculture (Table 2). Among the eight designated donors – Belgium, Canada, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the USA, the USA was the largest agricultural donor accounting for 34.8% of total agricultural aid. The USA was followed by the UK with 25% and Belgium with 10.7% (Table 2). For agricultural sub-sectors, the donors largely supported two sub-sectors, the agricultural development and agricultural policy sectors. Larger aid funds are often disbursed to the agricultural development sector since this sub-sector involves integrated farm development that requires substantial financing. In Rwanda, the two sub-sectors reflected preferences of the two largest donors. The USA provided 92.8% of its agricultural aid to these two sub-sectors, and the UK provided 76.8% (Table 3). Other key agricultural donors, Belgium and Japan showed different preferences. Belgium provided aid for agricultural services (including marketing policies support), and Japan provided aid for agricultural water resources.

For agricultural aid types, donors disbursed most agricultural aid as project types, followed by core contributions/pooled funds, for which donors share responsibilities with other entities including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral organizations (Table 2). Donor choices in aid types may be explained by donor preferences and constraints on aid [37]. Generally, donors favor project-type aid because projects allow donors to directly engage in project design and implementation. They also generate tangible outcomes that help donors gain public support. Agricultural projects often produce tangible outputs showing donor contributions to target rural areas, such as distributed farm equipment, established irrigation reservoirs, and constructed commodity storage facilities. While project-type aid was generally preferred, the key agricultural donors in Rwanda showed different preferences in aid types. The USA and Belgium preferred project-type aid, whereas the UK preferred core contributions/pooled funds. The UK, furthermore, was the only agricultural donor providing budget support (Table 3).

Budget support refers to direct financial assistance to a recipient government's budget through the recipient's own financial management system. Budget support provides the recipient government with little restrictive funding [39], although sectoral budget support – earmarked for specific sectors – has more constraints than general budget support. Budget support is perceived as the donor endorsement of policy choices by the recipient. Due to the fungible nature of budget support, it is offered selectively to recipients showing valid records of institutional quality or to those taking policy actions required for receiving budget support.



During the past decade, Rwanda received 7.4% of total aid (across all sectors) as budget support, 36% of which was general budget support and 64% of which was sectoral budget support [11]. Between 2000 and 2011, budget support constituted an average of 27% of Rwanda's public expenditure [37]. A reason for decreased budget support might vary, but a recent key reason was allegations of Rwanda's support to militia groups in the DRC. Especially, when a 2012 United Nations (UN) report criticized the Government of Rwanda for controversial activities in the DRC, donors started to suspend budget support to the country [37]. The donor budget support drastically decreased from USD 140 million in 2011 to USD 11.2 million in 2022 with yearly variations. The largest budget supporter, the UK completely ceased its budget support after 2014. To the agriculture sector, no budget support was provided after 2013. The UK, the only agricultural budget provider ceased its support after 2013 without any other donor replacing the UK's role. Bilateral donor governments generally do not provide budget support to recipients that are perceived highly corrupt or involved in internationally criticized practices. Donor governments tend to stay alert to whether their aid funds unintentionally support corrupt practices or conflicts in recipient countries. Otherwise, it may tarnish donor reputation.

In terms of aid delivery channels, an aid channel refers to the first-level aid implementing partner responsible for aid funds by contract or agreement [40]. With aid channels being divided into the state channel and non-state channels, the designated donors delivered 70.4% of agricultural aid through non-state channels, essentially avoiding the state channel (Table 4). In detail, one third of agricultural aid to Rwanda was delivered through the multilateral channel. The UK disbursed 52.6% of its agricultural aid through that channel, and the USA 30.9% (Table 5). Other smaller agricultural donors, including Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland preferred the multilateral channel as well. The UK and the USA had intensive partnership with the World Bank Group and its members (WB), leading to the WB implementing 84.4% of the multilateral-channeled agricultural aid. Other participating organizations included the World Food Programme (WFP), and CGIAR Fund (formerly known as the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research). Donors probably partner with multilateral organizations that are capable of both accomplishing donor aid goals and working effectively with recipient governments. It is generally a recipient government that manages aid being implemented by multilateral organizations. This arrangement may enable donors to avoid bureaucratic issues and potential friction with recipient governments. For smaller donors, using the multilateral channel can be more efficient because they can avoid administrative costs that otherwise incur when implanting the aid themselves.



The agricultural donors collectively delivered 29.6% of agricultural aid through the state channel in Rwanda. This is similar to 28.7% of agricultural aid delivered through the state channel in Uganda, but comparable to 48.3% in Ghana [41]. Ghana is considered to have relatively good governance, whereas Uganda is considered poorly governed. Individually though, the donors to Rwanda showed wide differences in the state channel use. Belgium and Japan provided most of their agricultural aid through the state channel, 78.3% for Belgium and 98.0% for Japan. By contrast, the UK provided 28.5% of its agricultural aid through the state channel, and the USA nearly bypassed the state channel (Table 5). The USA showed a strong preference for the NGO channel through which the donor disbursed 30.4% of its agricultural aid.

NGOs are an effective channel for agricultural aid. Donors unfamiliar with target rural areas may find local NGOs especially valuable due to their expertise on agricultural environments and commodity markets, their networks with local people, and their knowledge on norms of rural communities. In Rwanda, local NGOs rarely participated in agricultural aid. Donors disbursed 84.0% of agricultural aid through donor country-based NGOs, 11.2% through international NGOs, and only 4.8% through developing country-based NGOs [11]. The agricultural donors might find working with local NGOs challenging because freedom for NGO activities in Rwanda is considered very limited. Local NGOs need Rwandan authorities' agreement for their activities while operating under political scrutiny [42, 43]. Moreover, local NGOs tend to lack comparative advantages compared to donor country-based and international NGOs that may receive more opportunities for funding and knowledge sharing. Under those institutional circumstances, it is probably difficult for agricultural donors to partner with local NGOs.

In weakly governed recipients, the use of non-state channels allows donors to minimize bureaucratic inefficiencies and aid misuse. But donors' leaning towards non-state channels may have implications in the long term. First, prevalent use of non-state channels can undermine the recipient's efforts to strengthen its administrative capacity by actively managing and aligning aid with its development policies. Second, donors emphasizing non-state agencies as their primary aid channel may miss an opportunity to build tighter collaborative relations with the recipient. Such relations likely help reinforce bilateral ties. Third, strong aid ownership emerges when the recipient government directly engages in aid. Strong aid ownership is likely to sustain positive aid outcomes, therefore facilitating development of the recipient country. Donors' heavy reliance on non-state channels can weaken the emergence of strong aid ownership of the recipient government.



CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Aid is an outcome of negotiations between a recipient government and a donor. Rwanda –having authoritarian tendencies and being alleged to have controversial military involvements in the DRC – has paradoxically been a donor favorite in sub-Saharan Africa. This study examined details of agricultural aid provided by bilateral donors who generally highlight good governance. Under the division of labor agreement, the designated donors to agriculture provided aid mostly to the two sub-sectors of agriculture, in project types, and through the non-state channels. The contour of agricultural aid to Rwanda was shaped largely by the USA and the UK, collectively providing 59.8% of agricultural aid. The two donors avoided working directly with the Government of Rwanda as they almost bypassed the state channel. The two donors instead provided agricultural aid via multilateral organizations and donor-country based NGOs.

Bilateral donors emphasizing good governance, however, may not necessarily act on the poor institutional quality of a recipient country because those donors have to take a risk of losing access to the recipient government. The risk can be substantial if the recipient country is strategically important to donors, be it military, political or economic reasons. Alternatively, donors likely use tactics to avoid working directly with the recipient government while maintaining access and relations as in the case of agricultural aid to Rwanda. The findings of the study thus imply that the institutional quality of a recipient country has more influence on how donors deliver aid (than the amount of aid) once donor aid decisions are made.

It should be mentioned that traditional western donors do not always have the upper hand in aid negotiations. Emerging donors such as China and India often offer poorly governed African states aid with leeway, therefore, those recipients could resist political demands from traditional western donors. To understand a fuller picture of foreign aid to Rwanda, the next step may be to explore how traditional donors provided aid with the presence of emerging donors. Findings of such research probably provide more nuanced narratives on aid decision-making or aid tactics of traditional bilateral donors in weakly governed recipients.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

No conflicts of interest without funding support

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Table 1: Overall aid to Rwanda with years, donors and sectors

Year	Value total §	Donor	Value total	% of total ¶
2011	632.8	United States	2292.3	32.9
2012	481.3	United Kingdom	1124.8	16.2
2013	597.9	Germany	630.9	9.1
2014	497.9	Belgium	599.7	8.6
2015	622.5	Netherlands	541.8	7.8
2016	570.5	Japan	524.8	7.5
2017	571.9	Sweden	368.7	5.3
2018	537.5	Sector #	Value total	% of total
2019	609.4	13	1115.8	16.0
2020	602.4	11	915.4	13.2
2021	666.8	15	803.0	11.5
2022	568.5	12	789.9	11.4
Average	580.0	31	781.0	11.2

§ Measured in constant prices (2021 USD millions), ¶ share of total amount as %, # 11: education, 12: health, 13: population policies/programmes & reproductive health, 15: government & civil society, 31: agriculture

Table 2: Agricultural aid to Rwanda with designated donors, sub-sectors and types

Ag. donors	Value total §	% of total ¶	Sub-sector #	Value total	% of total	Aid type ¶¶	Value total	% of total
US	271.8	34.8	31120	338.2	43.3	A	34.3	4.4
UK	195.0	25.0	31110	220.0	28.2	B	248.5	31.8
Belgium	83.5	10.7	31140	46.7	6.0	C	470.1	60.2
Japan	61.8	7.9	31191	40.6	5.2	D	26.6	3.4
Netherlands	60.3	7.7	31130	20.8	2.7	E	1.5	0.2
Korea	39.1	5.0	31161	17.4	2.2		-	
Canada	17.4	2.2	31220	16.4	2.1			
Switzerland	6.0	0.8	31194	13.3	1.7			

§ Measured in constant prices (2021 USD millions), ¶ share of total amount as %, # 31110: agricultural policy and administrative management, 31120: agricultural development, 31130: agricultural land resources, 31140: agricultural water resources, 31161: food crop production, 31191: agricultural services, 31194: agricultural cooperatives, 31220: forestry development, ¶¶ A: budget support, B: core contributions and pooled programmes and funds, C: project-type interventions, D: experts and other technical assistance

Table 3: Agricultural aid of three largest agricultural donors with sub-sectors and types

Sub-sector								
US #	Value §	% of total ¶	UK	Value	% of total	Belgium	Value	% of total
31110	123.0	45.3	31110	76.7	39.3	31120	26.5	31.7
31120	129.3	47.5	31120	73.1	37.5	31191	24.1	28.9
31140	6.7	2.5	31130	16.3	8.3	31210	9.6	11.5
31150	0.4	0.1	31140	0.7	0.3	31163	7.5	9.0
31161	5.9	2.2	31161	2.4	1.2	31194	4.7	5.7
Aid-type								
US	Value	% of total	UK	Value	% of total	Belgium	Value	% of total
A	-	-	A	34.3	17.6	A	-	-
B	83.9	30.9	B	102.8	52.7	B	21.5	25.8
C	186.4	68.6	C	55.3	28.4	C	61.8	74.0
D	1.5	0.6	D	2.5	1.3	D	0.2	0.2

Measured in constant prices (2021 USD millions), ¶ share of total amount as %, # 31110: agricultural policy and administrative management, 31120: agricultural development, 31130: agricultural land resources, 31140: agricultural water resources, 31150: agricultural inputs, 31161: food crop production, 31163: livestock, 31191: agricultural services, 31194: agricultural cooperatives, 31210: forestry policy and administrative management, ¶¶ A: budget support, B: core contributions and pooled programmes and funds, C: project-type interventions, D: experts and other technical assistance

Table 4: Aid delivery channel in agricultural aid and total aid

Channel #	Agriculture channel value §	% of total ¶	All-sector channel value	% of total	
State	10000	230.9	29.6	3446.5	49.5
Non-state	20000	165.8	21.2	1630.3	23.4
	30000	4.5	0.6	31.5	0.5
	40000	251.0	32.1	729.5	10.5
	50000	33.6	4.3	241.8	3.5
	60000	63.6	8.1	475.5	6.8
	90000	31.6	4.0	404.5	5.8

10000: public sector institutions, 20000: NGO and civil society, 30000: public-private partnerships and networks, 40000: multilateral organizations, 50000: teaching/research institutions or think-tank, 60000: private sector institutions, 90000: other, § Measured in constant prices (2021 USD millions), ¶ share of total amount as %



Table 5: Aid delivery channel of three largest agricultural donors

Channel #	US value §	% of total ¶	UK value	% of total	Belgium value	% of total
10000	10.8	4.0	55.6	28.5	65.4	78.3
20000	82.6	30.4	11.9	6.1	15.9	19.0
30000	2.2	0.8	-	-	-	-
40000	83.9	30.9	102.6	52.6	2.0	2.4
50000	23.6	8.7	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3
60000	41.9	15.4	21.5	11.0	-	-
90000	26.7	9.8	2.8	1.4	-	-

10000: public sector institutions, 20000: NGO and civil society, 30000: public-private partnerships and networks, 40000: multilateral organizations, 50000: teaching/research institutions or think-tank, 60000: private sector institutions, 90000: other, § Measured in constant prices (2021 USD millions), ¶ share of total amount as %

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